I. INTRODUCTION
In the open Internet environment, and recently appeared P2P (peer to peer) and Grid environment, there is no doubt that the synergy and the resource sharing between systems are urgently needed. Due to a large number of agents, the dynamical and scattered of runtime environment and the main demand of access control, each agent is attached to different management domain, which makes traditional access control technology become unsuitable in authorization and access control in crossdomain environment, and it exposed some drawbacks.
In recent years, interpersonal trust [11] of sociology and social psychology was introduced to the research of authorization management of access control model by numerous scholars, established a mapping between agents' authorization relationship and trust relationship [1]12] . Actually, if we make a general survey of traditional access control model, authorization relationships are all based on the trust relationships among agents. However, the security interoperability models based on DAC, MAC and RBAC all established on the basic assumption of "user set is already known", it only suits for centralized or single management domain environment, so it exists much shortage in expandability [13] . Besides, the depth and granularity management of authorization in traditional authorization management policy exist birth defects, which makes flexibility and controllability difficult to adapt the dynamic variation of environment. In multi-domain environment, user set could not be known intimately, and strangers are difficult to reach a consensus with trusted third party to help to establish trust relationship. In 1996, M. Blaze first proposed the concept of trust [1] , introduced trust into authorization management, and developed trust management system PolicyMaker [1] and KeyNote [2] . Winsborough called this kind of trust management system the capability-based authoring system. In this system, requester still needed to be well known to service provider, and it can't build dynamic trust relationship with strangers. Li Ninghui [4] [5] presented a role-based trust management framework(RT). Authorization in RT models relied on agent's attributes. Then it's possible to establish valid trust relationships between strangers. However, in attribute trust authorization and access control policies which were used for building trust between strangers, the sensitive materials and resource possession information of interaction agents might exists leakage, and trust relationships between agents are usually dynamic.
In order to solve the above problem, Winsborough first presented the concept of automated trust negotiation (ATN) [3] , and introduced three constraint condition: Completion, Termination and High Efficiency, and ATN become an important research field currently. Trust Negotiation [3] [14] is a rapid and effective policy which establish trust relationship between enormous, dynamic and dispersive agents or group, source requester and provider build trust relationships automatically through interaction disclosure between credit authentication and access control policies. [3, 6, 7, 8, 9] . Winsborough proposed two kinds of trust negotiation policy: First one is eager policy, it requires negotiation side disclose all the trust credentials which satisfy access control policy protection after it received the information which opponent's side disclosed. Second one is parsimonious policy, and both sides of negotiation disclose required trust credentials after they disclosed enough access control policies. Eager policy tends to disclose too much trust credentials which irrelevant to trust establishment. But in parsimonious policy, negotiator starts with trust standard, according to the strict controlled pattern, reduces disclosure of irrelevant trust credentials as much as possible through exchange appointed access control policy. Negotiation interaction frequency and the number of trust credentials that both side hold have linear relation, which these two kinds of negotiation policy controlled. Yu [16] introduced disclosure tree model to represent state of ATN, and demonstrated that the goal of trust negotiation is to build a trust credentials complete disclosure tree. However, in order to simplify the research of negotiation policy, an obvious drawback of disclosure tree is it used propositional language to describe trust credential. Yu [16] proposed prunes negotiation policy, this kind of policy belongs to a modified backtracking strategy, searching "security disclosure sequence" space by using depth-first method. Because prunes policy is a kind of forcible search strategy, although it is intact, the search cost is too expensive. Holt [17] introduced the concept of hidden credential . Hidden credential is based on ellipse curve cryptography and has a good information security and data integrity, and it can prevent the disclosure of sensitive information. Oblivious Attribute Certificates (OACerts) [18] allows credential owner to select to use which attributes and how to use these attributes, in order to achieve the goal of prevent information disclosure. Matthew [19] protected privacy information by using encryption technology based on threshold mechanism, use access control policy as the key of information encryption exchange, and use attribute which relate to access control policy as the key of information decryption exchange, and set satisfaction of access control policy as precondition of the disclosure of information . This kind of system binds agents and policies together. Nonetheless, with the increase of access control policy scale, the processing capacity drops sharply when it faced complicated policy.
In the recent study of ATN, there was no rigorous formal definition of ATN abstract model, and the time behavior haven't introduced. Therefore, there was no rigorous formal definition to describe the processing procedure of ATN, and there was no consideration about the model's dynamic variation over time. For example, when trust negotiation session occupied system resources (CPU, internal storage) for too long, service provider did not provide any reasonable scheduling scheme to multiple trust negotiation session. What's more, malicious agents launched too much useless trust negotiation sessions, constituted denial of service attack. Finally, the whole system crashed.
This article presents the basic components of ATN abstract model. It defines ATN abstract model by bringing state-transition system. Based on this formalized basis, the time behavior will be explored. We analyze and discuss the time semantics of ATN, and describe the extended ATN by constructing a state-transition system with time behavior. Finally, we analyses the satiability in ATN security policy. This paper is organized as follows: in Section II we introduce ATN, provide the basic components of ATN abstract model, and define ATN abstract model by bringing the state-transition system; In Section III, we discuss time constraint property in ATN; In Section II we construct a state-transition system with time behavior to define ATN abstract model; In Section II, we analyze the satiability in ATN security policy; Section II summarizes whole paper.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS

A. Automated Trust Negotiation
ATN is mainly studied about the problem of building trust in cross-domains. The mainly difference between traditional access control and ATN is whether mutual negotiation have already known about each other identity, owned authorities and access control policies. In automated trust negotiation, we build trust relationship ultimately by disclosing attributes credentials step by step. Negotiation procedure usually emphasizes automation, not required or little required human intervention.
Example 1: In online electronic book city, electronic bookstore provides browsing book and subscribing book services only to registered users. User Alice attempts to visit electronic bookstore eBookMarket. The whole trust negotiation procedure is shown in Figure 1 : 1) Alice sends access request to eBookMarket; 2) eBookMarket estab-lished a policy: "provides services only to registered users", so eBookMarket sends request which is a credential (C 1 : register) contains registration information to Alice; 3) Simultaneously, Alice built a policy: "Agent which accesses registration credential C 1 must show its business license first", so Alice sends disclosure business license request(C 2 : businesslicense) to eBookMarket; 4) eBook-Market thought that business license C 2 can be inquired and confirmed by any user, so eBookMarket discloses business license C 2 ; 5) Alice received business license C 2 and the security policy of C 1 is satisfied, then, Alice disclosed C 1 to eBookMarket; 6) Finally, Alice's access is admitted. The whole procedure of trust negotiation costs time t.
B. Abstract Model of ATN
We have briefly introduced the research contents of ATN, and now we will present the definition of ATN abstract model.
Definition 1: ATN abstract model includes many components as follows:
·U: Agent Set; AT: Attribute Set; P: Policy Set; S: (Trust Negotiation) Session Set;
·UAT ⊆ U×AT, builds relationship between U and AT, and appoints which subjects have which attributes;
·PAT ⊆ P×AT, builds relationship between P and AT, and uses which policies to protect which attributes;
· user: S→U × U, which is a function that every session maps to two negotiators (Resource Provider, Resource Requester) ; ·policy: AT→2 P , which makes every attributes map to a policy set policy(t i )⊆{p| ( p, t i )∈PAT}; ·attribute: S→2 AT , which makes every session map to a attribute set. 
set that consists of request(c) and disclosure(c).
Here request(c) means to send request of disclosed trust authentication to opposite side, and disclosure(c) means to disclose trust authentication to opposite side. Statetransition function δ defines the changing rules of statetransition system. If input a∈Σ, system M changes from state k 1 to state k 2 , which means M read a in state k 1 , and changes to k 2 , recorded as k 1 ⇒ δ a k 2 . k 1 ⇒ δ * k 2 means state system M changes from k 1 to k 2 by going through zero or many times state transitions, and we call that state k 1 to state k 2 is reachable in the state transition system M. P is system policy set, for example, system policy set contains the protection policies of sensitive attributes. Generally, in the procedure of trust negotiation, we must consider security problems related with time; 1) Whether there is any user who occupied too much system resource for a long time; 2) The mount of service requests which service provider received is whether exceeds what service provider can stand. We mainly consider the security policy in two aspects blow:
·Security policy of single trust negotiation session time constraint: this kind of security policy restrains resource depletion problems of single trust negotiation session and restricts the malicious acts ability of single user, which makes that other legal user's service requests receive immediate response, and implements valid session scheduling.
·Security policy of multiple trust negotiation session time constraint: this kind of security policy restrains resource depletion problems of multiple trust negotiation sessions in system and restricts the malicious acts ability of multiple users, which ensures the normal operation of service provider. · Time range constraint of ATN: This kind of constraint regulates that users can only build ATN sessions in a specific time. For instance, in a business organization where working hours are limited, some services or access for some resources will not be provided and the related ATN will not be approved in the range of standby unattended time.
· Time length constraint of ATN: This kind of constraint regulates that the length of every ATN sessions cannot exceed a fixed length. We can use this kind of constraint to prevent that the ATN session occupied system resources for too long time (for example, CPU, internal storage), then it lead to other sessions can't get immediate response.
·Time length constraint of ATN in time range: This kind of constraint regulates that users build ATN sessions will accumulate time length, and the length cannot exceed an upper limit in a fixed amount of time. It can restrict the malicious acts from agents effectively and control the service time which supply to agents in a fixed amount of time.
·Counts constraint of ATN in time range: This kind of constraint regulates counts of ATN sessions, and it cannot exceed an upper limit in a fixed amount of time. It can restrict the malicious acts from agents effectively, and it can control agent's average ATN counts in a fixed amount of time.
Time Constraint in Multiple ATN Session
If we take time length and counts of sessions into consideration, multiple ATN session time constraint could be divided into two parts: Total time length constraint of ATN in time range and Total counts constraint of ATN in time range.
·Total time length constraint of ATN in time range: This kind of constraint regulates the accumulated time length of service provider responds all of the trust negotiations, and it cannot exceeds an upper limit in a fixed amount of time. Simultaneously, it affects the time of multiple sessions. For example, in order to prevent from too much trust negotiations which lead to the decrease of service provider's response capacity, we might need to restrict the accumulated time length which service provider responds all the ATN sessions.
·Total counts constraint of ATN in time range: This kind of constraint regulates the total counts of service provider responding the ATN sessions, and it cannot exceed an upper limit in a fixed range of time. Similarly, if we don't control the number of responsive sessions, it's possible that the malicious agent implements DoS attack.
Two methods above investigate the related time constraint of sessions in different aspect. However, time constraint of single ATN is aimed at controlling enemy's disposing capacity, and time constraint of multiple ATN is aimed at protecting the resources of service provider. A ATN session might contain both time constraint of single ATN and multiple ATN.
B. Definitons of Time Series and Time Interval
Definition 3(Definition of time series): Time series is a sequence that consists of a string of time variables 1 2 , , , , . We can define the "≤" relationship in this time series. , , In the above section, we introduced the time constraint features of ATN and defined several kinds of time constraint semantics. In ATN system, both sides of the negotiators use other's response as input in the interaction process, and decide whether the session should be proceed based on the local security policies(including sensitive attributes protection policy and time constraint security policy). Now, we use timed state-transition system to simulate the abstract model of ATN system with time constraint.
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Definition 6(ATN abstract model with time constraint): We use timed state-transition system M=<K, S, P, C, d> to simulate the abstract model of ATN system with time constraint.
·K is a state set; ·Σ is an operation set; ·C is a finite clock set; ·P is a system policy set; ·δ: K×Σ×2 P ×2 C →K is a state-transition function; For a given ATN abstract model with time constraint M=<K, S, P, C, d>, K and Σ are equal to the Definition 2 in section II. C is a finite clock set. P is system policy set, including sensitive attributes protection policy and time constraint security policy. State-transition function δ defines the changing rules of state-transition system. For example, when input is a∈Σ, we first determine whether system M satisfies a policy set P'∈2 P . If it really does, the system state will transform from k 1 to k 2 and after this change happened, the clock in clock set C'∈2 C will be fully reset(set zero) , recorded as ( k 1 , a, P', C')→k 2 . ( k 1 , * , P', C') → k 2 , which indicates that state system M transforms from k 1 to k 2 through zero or many times state transition. We call that state k 2 to state k 1 is reachable.
In ATN system, we analyze the satiability of security policy before executing system operations and determine whether current operation violates security policy and there is a safe interaction sequence which makes negotiation successfully, and then continue or stop the negotiation. However, security policy includes sensitive attributes protection policy and time constraint security policy, and the satiability decision becomes the key to assuring system security. In the next section of this article, we will analyze the satiability of security policy.
V. SATIABILITY ANALYSIS OF SECURITY POLICY
A. Satiability Analysis of Security Policy by Using
Turing Machine Generally, a time constraint security policy conveys the intention: It checks whether current session set satisfies time constraint condition set in the local area at a time constraint check point cp, if there is not, the current session request will not be approved or stop on-going session. Similarly, a protection policy of sensitive attributes conveys the intention: Before a ATN agent disclose a sensitive attribute at∈A, another ATN agent must disclose an attribute set. This set is a Boolean expression that consists of x, ¬x, ∧ and ∨ operations which constituted by the elements of set AT', AT' is a subset of AT. In other words, it can disclose at only the security policy of sensitive attribute at is satisfied.
We assume that every user can disclose its protection policy during the session. Only when we find a safe interaction sequence to assure trust negotiation successfully, then they disclose related trust verification to each other. Otherwise, this session will be stop.
Definition 7(Satiability of time constraint security policy) In ATN system, we use Constrain_time to indicate time constraint security policy set. If time constraint security policy p∈Constrain_time remains true at a time constraint check point cp(time constraint check point can be the start time of a session, timed cyclic query or the time that exceptions occurred), we call time constraint security policy p is satiable at check point cp.
Definition 8(Satiability of sensitive attribute sec-urity policy) In ATN system, we assume at∈AT, if there is a interaction sequence a i ,a i+1 , …,a j between two negotiators, here a l ∈{request(at') | at'∈AT } ∪ {disclosure(at') | at'∈AT }, l=i,…,j, attribute at can be disclosed after these interactions is over. We call the security policy of attribute at is satiable.
Clearly, the satiability decision of security policy will directly determine ATN success or not. We introduce symbol "⊥": at⊥AT' to indicate whether at is disclosed, it depends on whether elements in policy set AT' is disclosed. For random at∈AT, we can always get a related role set AT'. However, at'∈AT' might also exist an AT" (Opposite side regards at as sensitive attribute and formulate protection policy). Then we can replace the attributes in set AT' with the corresponding elements in set AT". In order to implement satiability analysis, we use recursion and try to find a subset AT at of set AT that related with at. However, AT at is the attribute set that determines whether attribute at can be disclosed, AT at ⊆ AT. For decision relationship at ⊥ AT at , the problem of the satiability decision of attribute at can be effectively solved if AT at is unique. We transform this substitution problem into the speech recognition problem of Turing Machine(TM). We first describe TM M which recognizes the character string w consists of elements in set AT. M = "For input character string w: 1) Scan the whole string from left to right, replace character at with all the elements of set T' which related to at.
2) If there was no replacement operation after step 1, then receive it.
3) Read-write head return to the extreme left of the string.
4) Go to step 1." It's easy to see that TM M can recognize character string w consists of elements of set AT. Only one stopped state is accepting state: the remaining characters are not contained in a random replacement rule, which explains that we find set AT at related to at, at will be disclosed as soon as the elements in set AT at have already disclosed. And this also explains that the both sides of trust negotiations exists at least one interaction sequence. If the both sides of trust negotiation interact according to this sequence, the security policy of attribute at will be satisfied.
B. Satiability Analysis of Time Constraint Security
Policy Theorem 1: The satiability problem of ATN time constraint security policy can be effectively solved within polynomial time.
Demonstration: The time constraint security policy of ATN session determines whether the time attribute of ATN which started by user u(u∈U) satisfies time constraint. From Definition 5 we can know that the start(stop) time of a random ATN session s t is unique and it can be attained by function start(s t )(or function end(s t )), then the result which obtained by time points implementing logical decision through constraint functions is unique, and these functions are: ATN time range constraint function, ATN time length constraint function, ATN time length constraint function in time range, ATN counts constraint function in time range, ATN total time length constraint function in time range and ATN total counts constraint function in time range. What's more, the result of the satiability problem of ATN time constraint security policy is unique. Time complexity can be divided into two situations: 1) For the security policy of single ATN session time constraint, it requires to obtain the start(stop) time of all the ATN sessions which launched by a single user. Assume [ , ] | | 
C. Satiability Decision Analysis of Sensitive Attri-bute Protection Policy
Theorem 2: The satiability problem of the stateirrelevant sensitive attribute protection policy can be effectively solved within polynomial time.
Demonstration: For the satiability problem of the state-irrelevant sensitive attribute protection policy, we determine whether the protection policy of attribute at(at∈AT) can be satisfied. We can recognize character string w by using M, finally, we can obtain a character string which consists of elements from attribute set AT at and the result obtained by attributes via these operations ∧, ∨ and ¬ is unique, so the result of the satiability of protection security is unique. This require to use all the decision relationships at ⊥ at i …at j during the replacement process and dexter symbols will not appeared in the left of all the used replacement before, otherwise loops will occur and the machine can't be stopped. Assure |w|=l, |P|=c 2 (c 2 is a constant), then the computation complexity of this recursion is O(c 2 l), which means it can be effectively solved within polynomial time.
We can use digraph to indicate decision relationships "⊥" among attributes, For instance, T ⊥ ={at 1 ⊥{at 4 }, at 2 ⊥ {at 3 }, at 3 ⊥{at 5 }, at 5 ⊥{at 2 at 4 }}, then the decision relationships among attributes "⊥" transform to digraph. From figure 2 we can know whether attribute at 1 can be disclosed, which depends on whether attribute at 4 has been disclosed. Similarly, we can know that the decision relationship among attributes at 2 , at 3 and at 5 formed as a cycle in figure 2 and it is described as an oriented cycle in figure 2 . The string length of TM M is infinite and the oriented cycle embodies as loop during the process that TM M recognizing character string w, and it results that the machine can't be stopped.
Theorem 3:
The satiability problems of common sensitive attribute protection policy are un-decidable.
Demonstration: We transform the satiability problems of common sensitive attribute protection policy to the halting problems in speech recognition of Turing Machine. When TM M halts, it carries the character string consists of elements from attribute set AT at , then the expression consists of these operation forms x, ¬x, ∧ and ∨ can be confirmed. Therefore, there is an interaction sequence which makes the protection policy of at be satisfied. When TM M doesn't halt, it carries character set which exists a replacement cycle.
If at∈AT and at ⊥ {at i … at j }, TMM's recognizing language w= at i … at j based on the front analysis, it can't decide whether M halted during iteration replacement process, then determine the satiability problems of the protection policy of attribute at is equivalent to the HALT problem [10] in recognizing language of TM M. This problem is un-decidable, and it results that the satiability problems of common sensitive attribute protection policy is un-decidable.
D. Simulation and Result Analysis
Simulation mainly studied the capacity of resisting DoS attack of ATN model with time behavior, explained the application effect of ATN model with time behavior through the comparison with the success rate of basic ATN model. Experiment environment is set that subject A interacts with object B. Thereinto, A is service provider, B is service request. B send negotiation request to A, then establish the trust relationship. Besides, we need simulate that malicious peers implement DoS attack to A. The attribute of model is the success rate of trust negotiation. We can decide that the model is good or bad based on the success rate of trust negotiation between A and B. In the process of establishing trust relationship, A and B proceed 100 times negotiation direct at 100 different transactions. We use different negotiation policies, privacy protection policies and time constraint policies during the negotiation based on the difference of negotiation transactions. It will come into different negotiation results if we change the negotiation policies, privacy protection policies and time constraint policies. Reversely, we can decide the rationality of negotiation policies, privacy protection policies and time constraint policies based on the success rate of trust negotiation model.
We examine the expected and authentic success rate of trust negotiation after finished all the transactions. The higher the matched degree, the more correct the trust negotiation description is. The success rate of trust negotiation demonstrates the model's practical application results. Simulation realized by using Virtual C++ 6.0. Simulation result is shown in Figure 3 . We can yield the following conclusion from simulation: ATN model with time behavior can fit with the real situation if we configured reasonable time constraint policy. It can maintain higher success rate of trust negotiation in DoS attack environment, its application effect is much superior to basic trust negotiation model.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article first presented the basic components of ATN abstract model, introduced state-transition system to define ATN abstract model. Based on this formalized basis, it explored the time behavior, defined time series and time interval, and formally analyzed the semantics of several kinds of time constraint, solved some problems, such as DoS attack, session scheduling, etc. It constructed a timed state-transition system, and it can describe the ATN abstract model more comprehensive and secure. Simultaneously, it analyzed the satiability decision of ATN security policy. However, it still need further study in protection policy of sensitive attribute and satiability decision of policy.
